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THE THESIS EXAMINES THE KUWAIT-IRAQ CRISIS OF 1990. THOUGH MANY ARGUMENTS WERE GIVEN BY IRAQ, THE BASIS FOR IRAQ'S ACTIONS WERE ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED. REACTION BY GREAT BRITAIN AND ARAB NATIONS WERE MOTIVATED BOTH BY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS.

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INTRODUCTION

On 19 June 1961, Great Britain announced it would relinquish its control of Kuwait and would grant complete independence and sovereignty to the tiny Middle Eastern country. The occurrence of this, at a time when support for Arab nationalism was rising throughout the region, should have been welcomed by all other Arab countries. However, within six days of the announcement of Kuwait's independence the leader of Iraq, 'Abd al Karim Qassem, hailed the independence with one breath and made plans to annex Kuwait in the next. Qassem announced that Kuwait had always been an integral part of Iraq, a part that was wrongly separated by Great Britain, and Iraq would now correct the situation allowed by previous Iraqi regimes. This announcement by Qassem caught not only the Kuwaitis and British offguard, but all other Arab countries in the region as well. Qassem was to set in motion a series of actions that would eventually be resolved by the Arab League.

In the course of my discussion of this crisis I will examine the relationship that existed between Kuwait and Great Britain prior to 1961, the nature of the Iraqi claims to Kuwait, the reactions by the United Nations and the Arab League, and both the interregional political and economic factors that contributed to the decisions made by the principle participants.

I will show that Qassem's claims to Kuwait were without any substantial validity and that the arguments presented by

the Kuwaitis were better supported by existing international documents, documents that were never challenged by the Iraqi government. I will further show the politics, and the final decisions reached, were influenced greatly by the political and economic situations that existed within the Middle East region. When Qassem and the Free Officers Movement came to power in 1958, Qassem did not envision an Iraq that was in union with the United Arab Republic under the leadership of President Nasser. However, this vision for Iraqi destiny was not shared by all the participants of the July 1958 revolution. As Qassem became more isolated because of his international and domestic activities, he lost the trust of his fellow Middle Eastern leaders and the general Arab populace. The vast oil riches of Kuwait were too important to the region as a whole to allow them to come under the control of a leader like Qassem. Qassem had proven himself to be an Iraqi nationalist before being an Arab nationalist, and this at a time when Arab nationalism was rising throughout the Arab countries. His new economic policies would require vast amounts of wealth to finance, wealth that was to be gained by taking over Kuwait; wealth that would no longer be available to the region as a whole.

Even though Great Britain acted in accordance with its June 1961 Agreement with Kuwait, and the countries of the Arab League in accordance with their Pact, their decisions were based more on political and economical considerations

**than on the higher ideals of Kuwaiti sovereignty or the
fulfillment of international and regional obligations.**

Chapter 1: The Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899

To better understand the Iraqi claims to Kuwait, a review of the internal political structure of Kuwait and its relationship with Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century is necessary.

In 1892, Abdullah ibn Sabah Al Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait since 1866 died. During his time as the country's ruler he had accepted in 1871 the title of 'Qaimaqam' [a term translated to be Deputy Governor and literally meaning "standing in the station of"] from the Turkish government.¹ Sheik Abdullah was succeeded by his brother Muhammad, a man who Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Dickson, the Assistant Political Officer to the British Resident of Muscat, described as:

"just as unwilling to oppose the Turks and, being weak and inefficient, virtually handed over control of his kingdom to a clever, unscrupulous Iraqi named Yusuf ibn Abdullah Al Ibrahim . . ."²

Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson goes on to describe Yusuf Ibrahim and his motives by saying:

"[Ibrahim was] a man of wealth in his native land, was pro-Turk and undoubtedly in their pay, hoping to see them [Turks] one day depose the Al Sabah and place himself and his family in their place."³

This arrangement continued until 1896, when Mubarak Al Sabah, a man described by Dickson as "a man of action, with a fanatical love for his country. . .", seized the throne and had his two brothers, Muhammad and Jarrah, assassinated.⁴ In 1897 Yusuf Al Ibrahim, the Governor of the Basra Province, wanted to appoint Mubarak as the

'Qaimaqam', but Mubarak refused 'seeing in the move a plot to get control of his country.'⁵ Fearing the Turks would move against Kuwait to enforce their and Yusuf Al Ibrahim's wishes, Sheik Mubarak intimated to the British that 'he and his people would like to come under British protection to avoid annexation by the Turks.'⁶

The British were aware of Sheik Mubarak's position and were already interested in ensuring Kuwait did not fall under the control of the Turkish or any other government. The British realized earlier the value Kuwait had in terms of providing Great Britain a path to its more prized area, India. Kuwait provided excellent deep water port facilities that would enhance shipments to and from India. A diplomatic communique from the British Resident of Turkish Arabia, General W. Loch, to the Government of India reflected this concern when Loch said, 'the occupation or protection, by the Porte, of Koweit, would be a standing menace to our trade interests in Turkish Arabia.'⁷ Not only were the British concerned with their own economic interests in the region, they were equally concerned with keeping Russia and Germany away from gaining increased influence in Kuwait. In a secret message from the British Foreign Office to the India Office, emphasis was placed on 'precautions as are possible against the establishment of any territorial claims on the part of Russia in that district [Kuwait].'⁸ A much stronger statement of British

resolve came from Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, when he said:

"[Britain] must and does claim, in return for the sacrifices to which she has submitted, and the capital which she has sunk, and the sake of the peace which she is here to guard, that no hostile political influence shall introduce its discordant features upon the scene. A Russian port . . . would even in times of peace import an element of unrest into the life of the Gulf"⁹

The British worries stemmed from negotiations that were being conducted between Count Kapnist, a Russian representative, and the Ottoman government. The negotiations were to conclude an agreement that would allow Russia a concession to build a railway from Tripoli, Syria to the Persian Gulf at Kuwait. In a communique dated 4 January 1899, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expanded upon the earlier message from the Foreign Office that discussed "precautions as are possible" by proposing:

"to the Secretary of State of India that steps should be at once taken to obtain from the Sheikh of Koweit an engagement that he will not cede, lease, mortgage or otherwise alienate any portion of his territories to the Government or subjects of any other Power without previously obtaining the consent of Her Majesty's Government."¹⁰

Germany, like Russia, saw the value of an interregional railway system. However, Germany envisioned the railway extending from Anatolia to the Persian Gulf, passing through Baghdad and having its terminus at Kuwait. Al-Ebraheem points out that Germany wanted the railway, known as the

Baghdad Railway, for two reasons:

"First, it was intended to strike a blow at British interests and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India. Second, it was intended as an instrument to secure markets for Germany's growing industries."¹¹

This railway system would also help strengthen the Ottoman government against the influences of the British and French governments in the region.

In reaction to both of the planned railway systems, and to protect her economic interests in the Persian Gulf region, the Government of India directed Lieutenant-Colonel M.J. Meade, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, to "proceed to Koweit, and enter into Secret Agreement with him [Sheik Mubarak]"¹² This secret agreement, the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899 (Appendix A), gave the British government everything it wanted in regard to Kuwait. It established Britain's position in the internal affairs of Kuwait not just during Sheik Mubarak's reign, but also for those of his "heirs and successors."¹³ Although the agreement fails to list defense of Kuwait as one of the British requirements, it did establish Kuwait as a British protectorate, if not in word, in deed. The Agreement remained secret until it was published in September of 1899 in response to Turkish threats to assert their authority in Kuwait. The British representative in Constantinople warned the Porte by stating:

"the British Government, while they entertained no designs on Kuwait, had friendly relations with the

Shaikh and that if any attempt were made to establish Turkish authority or customs controls at Kuwait without previous agreement with Her Majesty's Government a very inconvenient and disagreeable question would be raised."¹⁴

The perceived use of force by Great Britain was sufficient enough to stop any Turkish action against Kuwait. It was not until 1914 that Britain would establish Kuwait as an official protectorate. After Sheik Mubarak's support of the British in their war efforts in the region, Sir Percy Cox sent the Sheik a letter recognizing Kuwait as "an independent Government under British protection."¹⁵ This relationship would continue unchallenged until Iraq's claims were announced in June 1961.

Chapter 2: Validity of the Iraqi Claims

On 19 June 1961, the Sheik of Kuwait, Abdullah al Sabah Al Sabah, and the British Political Resident in the Arabian Gulf, Sir William Luce, signed an Exchange of Notes that terminated the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899 and granted complete independence and sovereignty to the Kuwaiti government.¹⁶ On 25 June, Qassem made claims on Kuwait as being an "integral part of Iraq."¹⁷ He went on to say in his announcement that Iraq did not recognize the "forged treaty" [Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1961] imposed on Kuwait by "imperialists". Qassem described the Kuwaiti officials that signed the 1961 agreement with Britain as "irresponsible people who are under the sway of imperialism" and he went on to say Iraq was pledged to struggle against imperialism as long as any part of the "Arab homeland" remained occupied.¹⁸

Iraq's claims were explained in more detail by Dr. Adnan M. Pachachi, the Iraqi United Nations delegate, during Security Council hearings on the crisis. Dr. Pachachi said "Kuwait is not, and never has been, a sovereign and independent state. Historically as well as legally, Kuwait has always been considered an integral part of Basra Province of Iraq . . .", and he went further saying Kuwait was "the mutilated part of our [Iraqi] homeland . . ."¹⁹ Dr. Pachachi claimed that Kuwait was an area under the administrative control of the Province of Basra and lacked the proper authority to enter into any agreements without

the approval of the Ottoman government. Lacking this authority, the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899 was rendered void. To emphasize the British were aware that the Sheik lacked any authority to make formal agreements he pointed out that the British acknowledged Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait in 1913:

"when they concluded a treaty [Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1913] with the Ottoman Empire whereby Kuwait was recognized as a part of the Basra Province and its sheikhs were recognized as under the authority of the Ottoman Governor of the Province."²⁰

Dr. Pachachi acknowledged the treaty was not ratified due to World War I beginning, but says 'it constitutes a clear cut recognition by the British, in a duly contracted international instrument, of the fact that Kuwait was part of Basra.'²¹ Since the country of Iraq was formed from the unification of the three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, Kuwait had always been a part of Iraq. Dr. Pachachi called the separation of Kuwait and Iraq "illegal and forced" and linked it to the 'Uqair Conference of 1922. The Iraqi representative claimed that at the 'Uqair Conference "the British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, attempted to impose on Iraq an arbitrary frontier with Kuwait. He was unsuccessful because the Iraqis . . . could not be forced to accept the mutilation of their country."²² Dr. Pachachi justified Iraq's claims to Kuwait by saying:

"The Governments under the old regime either were incapable or were unwilling to claim resolutely the legitimate rights of the country [Iraq]. This

is not the case now; the Government of the Iraqi Republic, . . . will never surrender or compromise on an inch of its national territory."23

Dr. Pachachi based Iraq's claims on the lack of validity of the Agreement of 1899 between Kuwait and Great Britain, on the British recognition of Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait with the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1913, and the unacceptable border assignments in the 'Uqair Conference of 1922. However, a detailed examination of each of these different issues will show a somewhat selective interpretation on the part of Iraq.

It is true that the agreement concluded between Great Britain and Kuwait in 1899 was done secretly and without Ottoman approval. What was unclear to the British was the actual status of Kuwait in relation to the Ottoman Empire. Lieutenant-Colonel Meade in a message to the Foreign Office described the Ottoman relationship in Kuwait as "the pretend Turkish protection"24 and in a message to the Government of India he says, "The Turks have never exercised sovereign rights at, or extended their authority to, Koweit, nor have they ever had an effective occupation of it . . ."25 Also, in September of 1899 when Britain published the agreement to warn off possible Turkish attacks on Kuwait, the Porte did not pursue the matter any more than expressing their dismay and applying pressure on Sheik Mubarak to break the agreement with Great Britain.26 Great Britain was unsure of Turkish control because the Ottoman Empire never


involved itself with the running of Kuwait. Only when others such as Yusuf Al Ibrahim or Germany and Russia showed an interest in Kuwait did the Porte show an interest.

The second argument presented by Dr. Pachachi related to Great Britain recognizing Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait through the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1913. The Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913 did have Great Britain "acknowledge the suzerainty of the [Turkish] Sultan over Koweit", but it went further and had "Turkey recognize the special position of Great Britain in the region of the Persian Gulf" and "the Ottoman Government pledged a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the principality. The existing treaties between the Sheikh and Great Britain were confirmed."²⁷ This agreement also resolved any questions regarding the geographical borders between Kuwait and other Ottoman controlled territories. The agreement recognized the autonomy of the Sheik of Kuwait as:

"the boundary of which formed a semi-circle with the town of Kuwait as centre, and the estuary of Khor Zubair where it joins the Khor 'Abdullah as the end of its radius to the north, and the hill of Quarin to the south, together with the island of Warba, Bubiyan, Maskan, Failaka, 'Auha, Kubbar, Qaru, Maqta', and Umm al Maradim, and other adjacent islets."²⁸

It also recognized an area in which the Sheik of Kuwait would have influence over the tribes (Map 1)²⁹. The area delineated in the agreement was substantially larger than the Kuwait of 1961. Dr. Pachachi pointed out the treaty

**Kuwait Boundaries According to
Anglo-Ottoman Negotiations 1912-1913**



MAP 1: Kuwait Boundaries of 1912-1913


was not ratified, but was a "duly contracted international instrument", and that the Ottoman government had complete authority over the Kuwaiti area. Accepting the fact of Ottoman suzerainty over the Kuwaiti area would also have to include acceptance of the fact that the Ottoman government could change the boundaries of Basra Province, a change that established Kuwait as a separate, geographical entity. With the delineation of an area of Kuwaiti autonomy, the only link between Basra and Kuwait after 1913 was one of administrative control. Also, in the agreement the Ottoman government accepted all treaties existing between Kuwait and Great Britain, including the Agreement of 1899. Since the treaty allowed all existing agreements to remain in effect, the relationship exercised between Kuwait and Great Britain was a valid one. The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1913 in no way altered the Agreement of 1899, it served more to clarify and accept the British-Kuwaiti relationship. To use part of the treaty, even though not ratified, as a basis for argument, would require that the whole intent of the treaty be used. This was something overlooked by Dr. Pachachi during his speeches at the United Nations.

The third argument presented by Dr. Pachachi was the unacceptable border settlement that resulted from the 'Uqair Conference of 1922. The 'Uqair Conference was convened in November 1922 to resolve questions concerning boundaries between Iraq, Najd [Saudi Arabia], and Kuwait. Ibn Saud

represented Najd; Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner of Iraq, and Sabih Beg, the Iraqi Minister of Communication and Works, represented Iraq; and Major J.C. More, the Political Agent in Kuwait, represented Kuwait.³⁰ Both Sabih Beg and Ibn Saud opened the conference with outlandish boundary claims, while Major More remained quiet and 'did not utter a word, as though Kuwait were not involved in the conference at all.'³¹ The discussions continued for five days with no progress, so on the sixth day Dickson says 'Sir Percy took a red pencil and very carefully drew in on the map of Arabia a boundary line . . .'³² to delineate the individual country boundaries. Map Two reflects the final Kuwaiti boundaries as determined in the conference.³³ Dickson pointed out that 'This gave Iraq a large area of the territory claimed by Najd. Obviously to placate Ibn Saud, he [Sir Percy Cox] ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of her territory and gave it to Najd . . .'³⁴ The boundary that was established between Iraq and Kuwait nine years earlier in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913 remained virtually unchanged. The 'illegal and forced' boundary imposed by Sir Percy Cox resulted in Kuwait losing territory, not the separation of it from Iraq as implied by Dr. Pachachi's statements. The geographical separation by borders between Iraq and Kuwait was the result of the Ottoman government's actions, not those of Sir Percy Cox.

The arguments presented by Dr. Pachachi during the U.N.

Kuwait Boundaries, After the Uqair Conference



MAP 2: Kuwait Boundaries After the Uqair Conference

Security Council sessions were the only ones provided as proof of the legitimacy of the Iraqi claims, even though an examination of each argument diminishes its validity significantly. If Iraq felt it had been wronged in the earlier events, why did it wait until 1961 to press its demands? Did Iraq have any other recourse prior to 1961 to present its arguments and lay claim to Kuwait? These questions will now be addressed.

The Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided between France and Great Britain, with each being assigned Mandatories by the League of Nations. When Iraq was formed from the three provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, there were no formal arguments, or even intimations, put forward by any Iraqi officials claiming Kuwait as part of the Basra Province. Later, after the Turkish War of Independence, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 established the borders between what is present day Turkey and the Arab World.³⁵ Article 16 of the treaty stated:

"Turkey hereby renounces all rights and titles whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty [area of current Turkey] and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned."³⁶

Article 27 of the treaty had Turkey renounce all 'rights of suzerainty or jurisdiction' over nationals or territories which later came under the sovereignty or the protection of

the foreign powers"37 Turkey in signing the treaty relinquished all control over any territory outside of what is modern Turkey, and passed the final disposition of these areas to the countries that signed the treaty. The area that would become Iraq remained under the terms of the Mandatory system and under British control. The British retained the authority over both Iraq and Kuwait, and Kuwait remained a separate, distinct territory under British protection. Even under the Treaty of Lausanne, Iraq and Kuwait were treated as different countries.

Iraq had another occasion to put forth a claim to Kuwait when it gained its total independence and admission to the League of Nations in 1932. The Council of the League agreed to Iraq's admission if "she [Iraq] gave a Declaration guaranteeing . . . international law," Iraq signed the Declarations on 30 May 1932, and on 3 October 1932 "Iraq took her place among the community of nations."³⁸ At that time the only territorial dispute that was pursued by Iraq was with Turkey over the Mosul Province.³⁹ The League after reviewing the case sided with Iraq and affirmed its borders. Neither prior to or after gaining independence and admission to the League of Nations, did Iraq press a territorial claim against Kuwait.

The existence of other documentary evidence that could substantiate Iraq's claim is an area avoided by Dr. Pachachi. Albaharna points out that "the independent State

of Iraq had already recognised in 1932 the present boundary limits of Kuwait by virtue of the Exchange of Letters of 21 July and 10 August 1932⁴⁰ The Exchange of Letters that occurred between Nuri Pasha al-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, and Sheik Ahmad Al-Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait, reaffirmed " 'the existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit' the definition of which was already embodied in a former Exchange of Letters, dated 4 and 19 April 1923 [the results of the 'Uqair Conference]."⁴¹ It is commonly accepted that agreements entered into by a country are valid for as long as the agreement stipulates, or until renegotiated by the interested parties. International agreements are not rendered invalid because the person or regime that made it is no longer in power or deemed unacceptable at a later time, an argument put forward by Dr. Pachachi in his address to the U.N. Security Council (see endnote 36). Even if this argument was accepted, the words of the Iraqi government, and even Qassem himself, would have showed recognition of a separate Kuwait. In his address to the Security Council, Badr al-Mulla, the State Secretary of Kuwait, cited numerous examples of Iraqi recognition of Kuwaiti sovereignty. In a letter dated 12 August 1958 from Qassem to Sheik Abdullah Al Sabah, Qassem says:

"I wish to inform Your Highness with great pleasure that instructions have been directed to the concerned Iraqi offices to free the transportation between our two countries [emphasis added]."⁴²

Strong emphasis was placed on Qassem's use of the phrase "two countries". Another example came from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry on 29 December 1958 when it requested "approval for the exchange of consular representation between Kuwait and Iraq with the aim of establishing formal relations between the two countries."⁴³ The establishment of formal relations with part of your own country is not a normal diplomatic activity conducted by a government. Finally, Badr al-Mulla cited a joint statement released on 5 June 1961, just twenty days before Qassem claimed Kuwait. The last paragraph of the statement said:

"Both parties are pleased that the discussions between them have been successful in furthering friendly and sincere relations between the two sister nations and in promoting commercial and economical ties which ensure the Arab understanding which will emerge from the sovereignty of the two sister nations."⁴⁴

The underlined portions add strong emphasis to the fact that Iraq while under Qassem's leadership recognized Kuwait as a separate country and not an 'integral part' of Iraq. The arguments, as presented by Dr. Pachachi in the Security Council meetings, were based upon weak proof and selective interpretation of documents. The, did not support the Iraqi claim, and even the words of Qassem and his government do not validate their claim.

With the arguments of both sides presented, I will begin an examination of the United Nations' and the Arab League's responses and their possible motivations.

Chapter 3: United Nations and Arab League Reaction to the Crisis

A short summary of the events as they unfolded would make the actions of the United Nations and the Arab League easier to follow.⁴⁵

- 19 June 1961 - Britain grants full independence to Kuwait. Retained an agreement to aid Kuwait if requested.
- 20 June - Kuwait applies for membership in the Arab League.
- 26 June - Iraq claims Kuwait.
- 30 June - Sheik of Kuwait requests British aid in accordance with June 1961 agreement.
- 1-7 July
 - British forces arrive (6,000 in a week)
 - British draft resolution in U.N. fails.
 - U.A.R. draft resolution in U.N. fails.
 - Arab League Sec-Gen travels to Baghdad, Kuwait, and the U.A.R.
- 11 July - Arab League convenes.
- 13 July - Moroccan delegate submits draft resolution to the League.
- 20 July - Iraq walks out of League meeting, League adopts resolution.
- 10 Sept - Arab Force begins movement to Kuwait.
- 3 Oct - Arab Force move complete (4,000 troops)
- 11 Oct 1961 - British military withdrawal complete.
- 8 Feb 1963 - Qassem overthrown in Iraq.
- 19 Feb 1963 - Arab Force removed from Kuwait.

Once Qassem made his intentions known to annex Kuwait, attempts were made both in the United Nations and the Arab League to reach a peaceful, diplomatic solution. Where the United Nations found itself caught up in international politics and unable to resolve the dispute, the Arab League actively pursued a resolution in accordance with its Pact.

In the United Nations two resolutions were debated, one submitted by Great Britain on behalf of Kuwait (draft resolution S/4855), and the other submitted by the United Arab Republic (draft resolution S/4856). Draft resolution

S/4855 (Appendix B) was submitted by Britain and called upon all countries "to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait."⁴⁶ Britain wanted to get the Iraq-Kuwait dispute into the Security Council for resolution, but also to explain why British military forces were back on Kuwaiti soil within two weeks of granting the country its independence. Draft resolution S/4856 (Appendix C) was submitted by the U.A.R. and called for the British "to withdraw its forces from Kuwait."⁴⁷ Even though the Egyptians were in support of Kuwait's independence, they saw the positioning of foreign troops on Arab soil as a much larger threat to the region's security. After several days of debate in which both sides presented the arguments listed in Chapter 2, the Security Council failed to adopt either of the draft resolutions. Draft resolution S/4855 was defeated because of a veto vote by a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union, and S/4856 was defeated because it only achieved three favorable votes failing to get a majority of the Security Council. Whether the negative vote by the Soviet Union, or the abstentions by the other Council members was motivated by the politics of the Cold War is not clear, and the discussion of it goes beyond the scope of this paper. What was clear was the failure of the Security Council to adopt a resolution, and that placed the whole dispute back into the hands of the Arab League and Great Britain.

The Arab League first became involved on 20 June when Kuwait submitted its application for membership to the League. On 26 June when Iraq made claim to Kuwait, the action moved into a crisis management operation for the League. Even though Qassem announced that he would only employ peaceful means to accomplish his annexation of Kuwait Abd al-Qadir Hatim, the U.A.R. Minister of State, announced "the U.A.R. government has received indications that forces of the Iraqi Army have been ordered to move toward the Kuwaiti borders."⁴⁸ In response to these reported troop movements, the Supreme Council of Sheikhs announced that "Sheik Abdullah had done everything possible to let Qassem return to peaceful ways. But we have no alternative now but to oppose force with force."⁴⁹ On 30 June, Kuwait requested British military support in accordance with the 19 June 1961 Agreement. Under the plans of Operation Vantage, British forces started to arrive on 1 July and by 8 July they had 6,000 troops in place in Kuwait.

When the Arab League convened its meeting to discuss the situation, the League Secretary-General, Abdel Khalek Hassouna, had already visited the governments in Iraq, Kuwait, and the U.A.R. to discuss possible peaceful settlements to the dispute. However, the arrival of the British forces introduced a new variable. The League not only had to settle the dispute, but it also had to deal with the insertion of foreign forces onto Arab soil. This

situation is what Hussein Hassouna described as "the primary question for the time being . . . removal of British troops from Kuwait."⁵⁰ It could be argued that it was more important for the Arab countries to get the British forces out of Kuwait to prove they were capable of solving Arab problems without the need of foreign intervention.

On 13 July, the Moroccan delegation in the Arab League proposed a draft resolution that called for the removal of British forces, an Iraqi pledge of non-force, the admission of Kuwait into the Arab League, the assistance by League countries for Kuwait to enter into the United Nations, the safeguarding of Kuwait's independence, and the support of the Kuwaiti populace in their desires to unite with any other Arab state.⁵¹ The last portion of the resolution was designed to pacify Iraqi resistance to the resolution, however Iraq was strongly opposed to it and informed the League Council it could not pass a binding resolution without Iraq's support. Iraq argued that under Article Seven of the Arab League Pact only "unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding" and since Iraq, as a member of the Council, would not vote in favor of the resolution Kuwait would not be able to gain admission to the League.⁵²

The League Council reconvened on 20 July, after each member state had time to review the resolution, and they decided to vote. Iraq again claimed Article Seven precluded a binding decision without its vote, and in anger departed

the Council chamber. After a lengthy discussion within the Council it was decided that Article Seven did not specifically state a unanimous vote must be by all the members of the League. Their interpretation of the article allowed a binding vote if it were unanimous by all members present at the time of the vote. The small ambiguity in the wording of the Pact allowed the Council to conduct its vote without the Iraqi delegate. Since the Iraqi delegate departed before the Council voted, its absence had no effect on the outcome. Kuwait was granted full membership in the League with a unanimous vote.

Also, under the provisions of the resolution and in accordance with Article Six of the League Pact, an Arab Force was formed to replace the British troops already in Kuwait. The Arab Force consisted of troops from Saudi Arabia (1,200), the U.A.R. (1,200), the Sudan, Jordan, and Tunisia, totalling approximately 4,000 soldiers. The first contingent started to arrive in Kuwait on 10 September 1961 and was in place by 3 October 1961.⁵³ As promised by the British and Kuwaitis, all British military forces were withdrawn by 11 October 1961. The Arab League force remained in Kuwait, albeit piecemeal, until 19 February 1963. With the overthrow of Qassem's regime on 3 February 1963, it was determined by the League that the last threat to Kuwaiti sovereignty in Iraq was gone.⁵⁴

A quick glance at the events of this crisis reveals a

situation in which governments when confronted with a very difficult decision based their actions on the correct interpretation of international documents and acted in accordance with their written agreements, the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1961 and the Pact of the Arab League. However, seldom in the course of world political events do governments act solely on what is right and just. More times than others, they make decisions in their own selfish interests. The Iraq-Kuwait crisis of 1961 when examined closely reveals the motives behind the decisions of Great Britain and the Arab League states.

Chapter 4: Interregional Politics

When the nationalistic movements began among the Arabs in the mid-1800's, there were strong feelings that the Arabs should unite and act as one state. They felt that what made them alike as Arabs was stronger than any of their differences, and they would be able to overcome their own regional problems to gain what they longed for - freedom from foreign intervention. After World War I the region was no longer a homogenous area without boundaries. Western powers, primarily Great Britain and France, decided what countries would exist and to a very large extent, what people would rule. As the different western-installed regimes became entrenched in their own borders, uniting as one Arab state became secondary to staying in power. In Article Two of the Pact of Arab League States the purpose for the League is "the strengthening of the relations between the member states [emphasis added]."⁵⁵ As a group of people with a common history, they still wanted to end western intervention, but now as separate Arab countries they started to become foreigners to each other. As Article Two shows, the Arab League was not founded on the idea of one Arab state, but on a federation of states working for the betterment of the Arab people as a whole. This subtle, but important, transition of priorities has caused the differences which were initially thought could be overcome, to become major obstacles to peace within the region. To a certain degree, the actions taken by some of the key

participants in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis were a result of these regional political differences.

From the outset, Saudi Arabia stood in strong opposition to the actions taken by Qassem and Iraq. King Saud, the ruling monarch of Saudi Arabia, described Qassem's actions as "strange" and added his support to Kuwait when he said, "As far as we are concerned, we are with you [the Kuwaitis] in the fight and struggle." His position was stated even more strongly in another radio broadcast when he said, "any mishap that befalls Kuwait affects Saudi Arabia and vice versa."⁵⁶ King Saud's statements, though not directly challenging Qassem, were directed to warn Qassem away from taking any physical action against Kuwait. Saudi support for Kuwait was never questionable during the entire crisis. During the discussions of the Arab League Council it was the Saudi delegate that convinced the other members that their votes could be binding even without the vote of Iraq.⁵⁷ Also, Saudi Arabia was quick to offer military assistance to the Arab League Force which replaced the British units already in Kuwait. The Saudi contingent of 1,200 soldiers was equalled only by the United Arab Republic's force. It could be argued that the Saudi Arabian government was motivated by the need to resolve the problem quickly and under the auspices of the Arab League, but this would be overlooking other possible motives. When Qassem and the Free Officers Movement came to power they overthrew

a monarchy, a monarchy Qassem described as a 'corrupt clique installed . . . to serve imperialist interests and personal aims.'⁵⁸ With Qassem's demands to annex Kuwait, he threatened to end another monarchy in the region. In an area of the world where the differences between the prosperity of one country to another is so evident, the idea that monarchies were less willing to share with the people was one that was being more easily accepted. Leaders of countries, by nature, are very limited in the kinds of reasons they can offer formally to justify their actions. The survival of the monarchy, though a very strong motive for wanting to check the actions of Qassem, would not be one that could be spoken publically, but it could well have been a major influence in the decision making of King Saud.

The other source of strong and vocal opposition to Qassem's move on Kuwait was the United Arab Republic under the leadership of President Nasser. Since his military defeat, but political victory, during the Suez crisis, Nasser's popularity grew immensely throughout the Arab countries of the Middle East region. Wilton Wynn states it quite clearly when he says, 'all readily admitted that Nasser was the symbol of their [Arab] movement. He was the most successful of them all, and so his name had become the flag of Arab nationalism.'⁵⁹ So widespread was Nasser's appeal that the term 'Nasserism' was used interchangeably with the terms 'pan-Arabism' and 'Arab nationalism'.

The rift that developed between Qassem and Nasser did not begin with the Kuwait dispute, but could be traced back to when Qassem came to power in July 1958. When Qassem and his regime came to power they used many of the key words and phrases to cover their action with the blanket of Arab nationalism. However, events in Iraq soon caused Nasser to doubt Qassem's allegiance to Arab nationalism and his ability to keep Iraq in the control of Arab hands. Qassem's power and the stability of his regime relied heavily on his ability to pit the different political groups in the country against each other. However, during the early months of 1959, the Communist party in Iraq nearly took over control of the government. Many of the leaders in the region did not think the communist movements backed by the Soviet Union were a threat, but Nasser did not share this view. In public speeches given in Damascus, Nasser "lashed vehemently at the Communists [in Iraq] as agents of a foreign power . . .", and he added, "The Arab people . . . will resist with the same determination attempts to bring them within a new sphere of dependence."⁶⁰ Whether Nasser intended his words as a warning to the foreign, Communist powers, or to Qassem is not clear. What was clear was Nasser's unhappiness with the turn of events in Iraq since the July Revolution.

It was also widely believed in the Middle East that Iraq would join forces with Nasser's pan-Arab movement. Jabir Ummar, the new Iraqi Education Minister, said, "Iraq

will now march with the United Arab Republic toward the total liberation of the entire Arab motherland and the realization of complete Arab unity."⁶¹ Early reports after the coup in Baghdad also fueled the speculation of an Iraq-U.A.R. union. On July 14, a political commentator in Baghdad 'described the rising as 'part of the great revolution of the Arab peoples who were led and liberated from oppression and corruption by President Abdel Nasser.' "⁶² This point was even further emphasized by the new Deputy Premier of the Iraqi Republic, Abdel Aref, when he said, 'It is wrong to speak of Kuwait or Iraq or the United Arab Republic. These are just names, we are all one country and one people."⁶³ Uriel Dann pointed out that Aref 'left no doubt that he regarded Abdel Nasser as his leader in a revolutionary struggle involving the Arab world, where Iraq was only one of several fronts."⁶⁴

As key members of Qassem's new cabinet and even his Deputy were speaking of total Arab unity and leaning toward Iraq's following Nasser, Qassem was attempting to distance himself from such a union. From the beginning Qassem called for close ties with the U.A.R., but he said 'There will be an Iraqi republic which will preserve Iraqi unity . . .'⁶⁵ Qassem welcomed one of the first groups to his office after the coup by saying, " 'I am the son of the people, . . . I shall offer my life for the Iraqi Republic. . . .', and to another he said, " 'We are brought together by one aim,

to serve our republic, ' '66 Qassem quickly established himself as an Iraqi national before being an Arab national.

This difference of opinion between Qassem and the pro-Nasser elements of the regime soon led to an internal split. On 12 September 1958, Aref was removed from his position as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and on 30 September from his two cabinet positions. These moves were initially reported as necessary to facilitate Aref's move to his new assignment as the Iraqi ambassador to West Germany. But on 7 October 1958, it was reported that Qassem "smashed a revolt by soldiers supporting his chief rival, Col. Abdel Aref", and that the soldiers were "angered because the Premier had removed Colonel Aref from his military position."⁶⁷ Qassem was a believer in the ideals of Arab unity, but not to the point of sacrificing his power to Nasser. Lorenzo Kimball says, "It was Kassem's aim to establish a modern state based on the sovereignty and independence of Iraq." Kimball states later that Qassem "did not want his state to be dependent on Western support; nor did he want it to be in political union with President Nasser's United Arab Republic despite the lip service paid by him and his colleagues to the cause of Arab nationalism."⁶⁸ When pro-Nasser elements became too vocal and bothersome, they were quickly removed from the political scene. Aref's hasty appointment as ambassador to West

Germany and his subsequent arrest and conviction on conspiracy charges reflected Qassem's ironfist control of Iraqi politics and his unwillingness to share that power.

The interregional politics of the Middle East during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis were much like an iceberg, with only ten percent showing and ninety percent hidden below the surface. The reasons that were given publically for the stiff resistance to Qassem's bid to annex Kuwait merely reflected the visible ten percent of the iceberg. Veiled behind those reasons were motives less acceptable to the governments of a modern world, but motives very powerful in their ability to influence decisions. Whether King Saud believed Qassem would attempt to topple all the monarchies of the region, or even if Nasser doubted Qassem's sincerity to Arab nationalism or if he doubted Qassem's ability to keep Iraq within the Arab sphere of influence, may never be proved or disproved. But to so easily accept the quick, evident reasons as justification for the actions taken by the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia would be denying the realities of modern, world politics. The dreams of unity so dearly embraced by the Arabs of the emerging states after World War I fell victim to the realities of modern politics, realities that were well learned and applied by the leaders in the Middle East of 1961.

Chapter 5: Interregional Economics

As much as interregional politics may have played a role in the decisions of the different participants in the 1961 crisis, economic factors were more important. Qassem was committed to major social and economic reforms to bring about real growth in the Iraqi society. At the same time, he became engaged in complex, internal political maneuvers and conflicts that diverted his attention and the assets of the state from their primary objectives. Money he could have used to fund his economic policies was being used for defense spending and the suppression of internal revolts. Also, Iraq had become politically isolated in the Arab world because of its involvement with western powers and the rift between Qassem and Nasser. Turning to his Arab neighbors for assistance became much more difficult, and Qassem's new policies required new revenues. Kuwait was to be Qassem's new source of revenues.

As much as Iraq had a vested interest in gaining control of the vast wealth and resources of Kuwait, other Arab countries had a major interest in keeping it out of Iraq's control. The economic benefits from an independent Kuwait were being shared by others in the region, and jeopardizing that relationship was too large a risk. I believe it was the need for Kuwait's wealth that was the driving force behind Qassem's actions to annex the country, and the interregional economic links that forced the Arab League to find a quick, acceptable solution to the crisis.

Economics was also the major reason for Great Britain's role in the crisis.

Prior to Kuwait's gaining independence from Great Britain, there were rumors "that Britain was contemplating bringing Kuwayt, after independence, into the Commonwealth."⁶⁹ Majid Khadduri points to this fear that Kuwait might have left the Arab sphere of influence for the Western world as the impetus for Qassem's decision to annex Kuwait. Khadduri tells of a conversation he had with Mahmud 'Ali al-Dawud, Qassem's adviser on Persian Gulf affairs. Khadduri says al-Dawud told him "that Qasim began at that time to ask for information on Kuwayt's historical connections with Iraq."⁷⁰

In a speech given on 30 April 1961, Qassem strongly opposed the proposed merger of Kuwait into the British Commonwealth and "urged the Shaykh to oppose any such imperialist schemes and promised to support the Kuwaytis as Arab brothers . . ."⁷¹ Appendix D shows that Iraq was not a resource poor country.⁷² Iraq, as one of the original members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), had over eight percent of the world's proven oil reserves. However, by 1960, Kuwait had over fifteen percent of the world's proven reserves and had produced over 80.5 million tons of oil.⁷³ This proven and potential for long-term earnings made Kuwait a very attractive prospect for any country. Khadduri says, "These revenues, provoked envy in

Arab lands and attracted the jealous eyes of Arab leaders .

. . ."74 To understand why Qassem not only wanted, but needed the vast wealth of Kuwait will require a review of his economic policies and the economic condition of Iraq during his regime.

When Qassem and the Free Officers Movement came to power in July 1958, they "promised to wipe out all social injustices and carry out schemes designed to ensure the country's economic independence."75 Their basic plan consisted of four parts: agrarian reforms, the beginning of social and cultural plans, industrialization, and negotiations for new oil agreements with the Iraqi Petroleum Company.⁷⁶ Qassem was careful not to isolate and alienate any sector of society when he said, " 'We will not lower the standard of the rich, but we will raise the standard of the poor.' "77 To be able to accomplish all the reforms he had promised, all facets of his general plan would have to work. Failure in any area would mean others could be heavily impacted upon and have serious repercussions for the stability of the Iraqi economy, the Iraqi society, and his regime.

The first part of Qassem's economic policy was the reform actions required within the agricultural sector of Iraqi society. In less than two months of when Qassem came to power, a new agrarian reform law was announced. Majid Khadduri states the new law 'was designed to meet Iraq's

needs and aspirations."⁷⁸ The goals of the reform law were primarily to rid the Iraqi agricultural sector of feudalism, and to increase production of needed crops. However, emphasis was placed on the first goal, and the "immediate result of the agrarian reform was a fall in agricultural production,"⁷⁹ The decrease in agricultural production was not one of a small scale, as the United Nation's Supplement to the World Economic Survey of 1961 pointed out:

"The poor harvest, on the other hand, reduced agricultural exports and necessitated grain imports. Thus, despite the increase in oil revenues in 1960 - to an estimated sum of \$267 million - the account on goods and services registered a deficit of about \$15 million."⁸⁰

This drop in production is even more dramatically reflected in the table shown in Appendix F.81 From 1958, when Qassem came to power, until 1960, the value of agricultural exports dropped from \$111 million to just \$60 million. This net loss forced Iraq to import many crops that would normally be grown for consumption, and reduced revenues from any of the export crops. One half of the desired goals envisioned for the agrarian reform failed to materialize, and the primary one was not working out as Qassem had hoped. The process of ridding the Iraqi agricultural sector of "feudalism" was a slow undertaking, one the peasant farmers were unwilling to wait for. In the late summer and fall of 1958, peasants revolted in several regions "looting and sacking landlords' property, burning residences, and destroying accounts and

rent registers.⁸² The riots were soon followed by actions of the Communists in the country to organize the peasants into a national federation that demanded the right to control land redistribution.⁸³ The landlords throughout the country were so shocked by this demand, and fearing Qassem might give in, closed down their farms and failed to cooperate with Qassem's government. This shut-down caused large farm areas to become nonproductive, adding to the already low production. Qassem was forced to compromise with the landlords by increasing their share of the crops produced.⁸⁴ Both goals sought by Qassem were never achieved through his Agrarian Reform Law, and on the one year anniversary of the Law's implementation, Qassem and his Minister of Agrarian Reform, Ibrahim Kubba, were forced to promise a "greater attention to agrarian problems"⁸⁵ The reform law had a very ambitious program and would have required exceptional management even under the old level of government funding, but as Appendix E shows, Qassem reduced the amount of the agricultural allocation in his four-year provisional plan and his first detailed plan. These reductions combined with the reforms he wanted only complicated the economic conditions for the country. As pointed out earlier, if one area of the plan became deficient, it would have a probable negative impact on the overall economic recovery program. Qassem's agrarian reform fell well short of any of its desired goals.

The social and cultural reforms envisioned by Qassem were not as poorly handled by the government as was the agricultural reforms, and their impact on society, whether good or bad, is difficult to measure. However, what can be measured from these reforms is their cost to the government. As seen in Appendix E, as agricultural allocations decreased in Qassem's plans, the overall allocations for other areas showed a marked increase. In the areas of Transport / Communication and Building / Housing, an overall increase in allocations totalled 29 million Iraqi Dinar (ID). Great expansions in the field of education caused that budget to increase from 13 million ID in 1958 to 24 million ID in 1960.⁸⁶ Though the net benefit of these programs would be positive for the country, the immediate result was an increase in allocations, allocations the government did not have on hand. Again, as with the agrarian reforms, the government gained nothing initially except expenses it could not afford to pay.

To answer many of these economic problems, Qassem and his ministers developed their first detailed economic plan to cover the time period 1961/62 until 1965/66. This Sixth Development Plan, also known as Act No. 70, was heavily dependent upon Iraq's benefitting from its primary resource, oil. Khadduri points out that Qassem was very aware of this fact and that he was "hoping to extract from the oil companies" the necessary revenues needed to fund his entire


program.⁸⁷ Almost from the time of his coming to power, Qassem was in constant negotiation with the oil companies. His demands for revisions in the concession agreements, the participation of the government in the oil companies' capital at a rate of twenty percent, and relinquishment by the oil companies of unexplored/unexploited areas were key to his program's success. However, the negotiations were broken off in April 1961 without an agreement being reached between the two groups.

Qassem was faced with a major dilemma. His economic reform package was falling apart because of set backs in the agricultural sector, demands for increased revenues to pay for the social and cultural changes, and his failure to get the concessions he wanted and needed from the oil companies. He was also faced with much civil unrest, especially with the Kurdish people, in the northern part of Iraq. Any surpluses Iraq was able to get from its sale of oil were quickly being used up to pay for defense and food shortages. Qassem needed to increase the country's revenues quickly - Kuwait provided him with the answer. Khadduri pointed out that "the combined resources of the two countries [Iraq and Kuwait] were to provide the funds necessary for his various schemes."⁸⁸ Kuwait possessed one of the largest known oil reserves in the world and when combined with Iraq's known reserves, would make Iraq the premier oil producing country in the world. Iraq would

not only control a quarter of the world's oil, but it would probably become the most powerful voice in OPEC and affect the world market in terms of price and availability of oil.

Kuwait also offered more to Iraq than just its vast oil reserves. Its bay was an ideal terminus and port for an Iraqi railroad, an idea that had been actively pursued by both Germany and Russia prior to World War I.⁸⁹ Iraq's only port facilities were located at Umm Qasr along the Persian Gulf, and this facility lacked any deep water capability. Because of this Iraq was forced to move its oil through a network of pipelines that crossed through Syria (Map 3).⁹⁰ Knowing the vulnerability of this setup, Qassem had long tried to form a union with Syria. However, given Syria's union with the U.A.R. and the relationship that had developed between Qassem and Nasser, that merger was far from possible.

One other benefit for Iraq annexing Kuwait can be seen from the information in Appendix G.⁹¹ Between 1950 and 1960, Iraq's population had increased 34 percent so that the number of people in Iraq in 1960 was over seven million. Conversely, Kuwait's population numbered only 219,000 in 1960. Qassem would not only gain oil, a much needed port facility, but also an outstanding opportunity to increase the employment possibilities of the Iraqi people. In terms of his economic program and the country's future development, the acquisition of Kuwait could not have a



MAP 3: Oil Fields, Pipelines, and Ports in Iraq

negative impact. Faced with the prospect of economic failure and the possible collapse of the system, and the further destabilization of society, Qassem made the decision to annex Kuwait in June 1961. This action faced stiff resistance from all other Arab countries and Great Britain. The last chapter discussed possible political motivation for this opposition, but the economic ramifications of Kuwait falling under Qassem's control provide a stronger explanation for the resistance.

Since the primary focus of this paper is to explain Arab actions in regard to the Iraqi attempt to annex Kuwait, only a short examination of British motivation will be done. The relationship between Great Britain and Kuwait went well beyond one of Kuwait being a British protectorate. Great Britain was the primary partner in the Kuwait Oil Company, the oil company with the lion's share of oil production in the country. To have Kuwait taken over by Iraq, which viewed Great Britain as an imperialistic and scheming power, would surely have a negative effect on the oil company. Besides providing Great Britain with its primary source of oil, Kuwait imported substantial amounts of goods from Britain. Appendix H shows Great Britain to be Kuwait's single largest source of exports and imports from 1960 through 1961.⁹² Great Britain not only had firm political reasons for intervening, but also substantial economic ones as well.

Among the Arab countries, the United Arab Republic, under President Nasser, was the most vocal against the Iraqi action. Nasser was a shrewed political leader and knew he needed to deal with the West from a position of strength.

Wilton Wynn says of Nasser:

"His experience with the West had convinced him that he would never be truly respected unless he were strong. He knew his weaknesses militarily and economically. But he could become strong politically through his influence over the mass of people occupying the strategically vital, oil-rich Middle East."93

Nasser felt Arab unity was the key to the Middle East's being able to function effectively with the West. As part of his idea of Arab unity, Nasser felt the Arabs could exert great influence if they made full use of their endowments: "a rich cultural heritage, a central location on the world's crossroads, and considerable material resources.", and he saw Arab strength coming from a "society which has been reconstituted so that it can create and produce and distribute equitably among its members the fruits of their labor."94 Nasser envisioned this unity extending from the Atlantic to the the Persian Gulf and "Kuwayt, with its rich resources, could help to achieve this ultimate objective if it came into the orbit of his influence."95 The New York Times echoed this idea in an interview with Arab diplomats in Beirut. The unnamed diplomats said they believed Qassem "was maneuvering against efforts by President Gamal Abdel Nasser . . . to gain control of Kuwait and her more than

\$400,000,000 a year in oil revenues." They went on to say, Its [Cairo's] long-term tactics are to foster the Nasserite movement in Kuwait that believes Kuwait should throw all her wealth into a greater Arab unity movement that would be headed by President Nasser.⁹⁶ Nasser understood clearly the power that was linked with the oil-rich states along the Persian Gulf, and allowing the richest of these states to fall under the control of Qassem was totally unacceptable. For Nasser, an independent Kuwait was better than one under the control of Qassem.

Kuwait's economic importance to the other Arab countries goes beyond Iraq's needs and Nasser's plans for Arab unity. Kuwait was economically linked to many, if not all, the countries in the region before it gained its freedom. Appendix H shows that Kuwait exported \$59.1 million and imported \$16 million dollars worth of trade within the Middle East alone, and this trade was conducted with at least seven major countries and others not listed specifically. A 1965 Kuwaiti Statistical Abstract published by the Central Statistical Office of the Planning Board lists the countries in which Kuwait exported products (Appendix I).⁹⁷ From this table for 1960, over 83 percent of Kuwait's exports went to Middle Eastern, Arab countries totalling over \$6.7 million Kuwaiti Dinar. The other Arab countries of the region were by far the largest recipients of Kuwaiti exports, linking those countries not only to

Kuwait, but to some western nations also. Since Kuwait was not a major producer of manufactured goods and its primary resource was oil, Kuwait served as a critical point in which imports into the region from other parts of the world were reexported within the region. In this way many Arab countries could receive western goods without having to deal directly with the western countries. Kuwait also participated heavily in lending money to other Arab countries. Though detailed records before 1961 were not available, Ragael El Mallakh says in his book about Kuwaiti regional, economic cooperation, "Long before its independence, Kuwait was already an aid extender, with a program consisting of outright grants to its immediate neighbors in the Gulf."⁹⁸ The economic links between Kuwait and the other countries of the region were well established before Great Britain granted full independence to the tiny, oil-rich state. Kuwait had proven herself to be an established participant in the Arab world's economic arena. The Al-Sabah family could probably be trusted to continue that same relationship after independence, but Qassem was a variable the other Arab leaders could not predict.

Qassem's record of trade within the region would lend support to the concerns of the other Arab leaders. In an annual International Monetary Fund document that covers from 1958 through 1962, Iraq's total exports within the Middle East region decreased from \$52.8 million dollars in 1958, to

only \$8.4 million dollars in 1960 (Appendix J). The drought that devastated Iraq's crops during this period did contribute to the decline, but it alone would not explain the large drop in economic activity. Given Qassem's record of cooperation within the Arab world, it could appear that Iraq had adopted a position of less economic activity with fellow Arab countries and one of increased activity with countries outside the region, mainly the Soviet Union. The table in Appendix K shows that Iraq's exports with Middle East countries accounted for only two percent of its total exports and only four percent of its imports.⁹⁹ At the same time trade with western Europe and the United States accounted for over a quarter of Iraq's exports and forty percent of its imports. Even if Qassem's intentions had been in the best interests of the Arab world and Arab nationalism, his actions prior to the 1961 incident did not endear him to his Arab brothers. When the other Arab countries of the region were faced with a choice of an independent Kuwait ruled by the Sabah family, or an annexed Kuwait under Qassem's rule, they chose what historically had proven to be in their best interests - a Kuwait ruled by the Sabah family.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Iraq's, and maybe more appropriately Qassem's, bid to annex Kuwait failed for many reasons. First, all the political reasons favored Arab opposition to the move. At a time when the Arabs needed to portray an outward image of solidarity, the Iraq-Kuwait crisis caused unneeded setbacks. Clearly, Nasser was the unquestioned leader and representative of the Arab nationalistic movement to not only the western world, but to most Arabs. Nasser was a proven leader to the Arabs and their loyalty to him across country boundaries was proof of that. Qassem, on the other hand, vowed to support Iraqi nationalism before Arab unity, and he opposed Nasser often in his speeches. This action alone would alienate many of the Arab populace. However, it was Qassem's inability to control the internal struggles of his own country that led many Arab leaders to oppose him politically. He was seen by many other leaders as a man who was unpredictable and someone who could not be trusted to put the welfare of the Arab people before his own. Qassem did not recognize the political realities of the situation in the region at the time, and his unwillingness to meet the other Arab countries and cooperate with them, cost him the political support that would have been necessary for his success.

Second, the economic reasons for opposing the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait were overwhelming. Kuwait had long been an established participant in the economic network

in the region. Its vast wealth and resources were benefitting many, if not all, the other Arab countries of the region. Kuwait supplied necessary capital to fund development projects, she hired many workers from outside the country whose wages helped supplement their countries revenues, and she proved to be an excellent partner in the export and import of goods within the region. Many would argue that Kuwait should have shared much more of its wealth with the poorer countries of the Middle East, but the fact did remain that the Sabah family did aid its Arab brothers when needed. This degree of anticipated consistency is what sealed the fate of Qassem's bid to annex Kuwait. The Sabah family historically supported its Arab neighbors and the Arab causes, while Qassem, since his rise to power, had demonstrated Iraq was first and foremost in his actions. Qassem had proven himself to be too big of a risk to be given control of the vast resources, and power, that came with Kuwait.

There is a saying that hindsight is 20/20, but recent events in 1990 would bring this saying into doubt. As Qassem had attempted to take over Kuwait in 1961, Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, did so in 1990. The major difference between the two events was that Saddam Hussein used the military force necessary to achieve his goals, and when comparing the two events this stands out as the only discernable difference. Both Qassem and Hussein used the

historical arguments about Kuwait and Iraq always being one country. The arguments did not work in 1961, they did not in 1990. Both Qassem and Hussein used Arab unity as a veil to hide behind and gain support. Qassem's emphasis was on breaking the imperialistic links between Great Britain and Kuwait, while Saddam Hussein used the Palestinian issue as a means to stir Arab emotions. When all was said and done, the truth as to why Qassem, and later, Saddam Hussein took the risks of taking over another country came down to economic motivation. Qassem was desperate to get his economic reforms going while he struggled with internal conflicts that diverted money away from his projects. Hussein had emerged from a long, costly war with Iran and when threats failed to achieve the desired results, he took Kuwait by force.

Saddam Hussein must have studied the events of 1961 before embarking on his venture in 1990 and the lesson he came away with was that force could make all the difference. In as much as Qassem failed to realize the political and economic realities of the times, so did Saddam Hussein. In both instances, Iraq came out of the ordeal much weaker and worse for having taken the risk. The lessons of history are available for learning, but the sad reality is that the mistakes of yesterday, are the mistakes of today, and will be the mistakes of tomorrow. Maybe this is the only true political reality.

ENDNOTES

¹Hassan A. Al-Ebraheem, Kuwait: A Political Study (Kuwait: Kuwait University Press, 1975), p. 38.

²Harold R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbors (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1956), p. 136.

³Ibid, p. 136.

⁴Ibid, p. 136.

⁵Ibid, p. 137.

⁶Ibid, p. 137.

⁷Dr. Robin Bidwell, The Affairs of Kuwait, 1896-1905 (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1971), p. 25.

⁸Ibid, p. 32.

⁹Al-Ebraheem, p. 46.

¹⁰Bidwell, p. 32.

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¹²Bidwell, p. 35.

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¹⁹United Nations Records, Security Council Official Records for the 957th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.957. New York: United Nations, 1961, p. 11.

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APPENDIX A: Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899

No. 2.

AGREEMENT OF 23RD JANUARY 1899 WITH RULER OF KUWAIT.

(Translation.)

Praise be to God alone (i.e. in the name of God Almighty) ("Bismillah Ta'ala Shashab").

The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is, that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, on behalf of the British Government, on the one part, and Shaikh Mubarak-bin-Shaikh Subah, Shaikh of Kuwait, on the other part; that the said Shaikh Mubarak-bin-Shaikh Subah, of his own free will and desire, does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, not to receive the agent or representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors, not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose, any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Shaikh Mubarak which may now be in possession of the subjects of any other Government.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Shaikh Mubarak-bin-Shaikh Subah, the former on behalf of the British Government, and the latter on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures, on this the 10th day of Ramazan, 1316, corresponding with the 23rd day of January 1899.

(Sd.) M. J. MEADE, Lieut.-Col.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

(L. S.) (Sd.) MUBARAK-AL-SUBAH.

Witnesses:

(Sd.) E. WICKHAM NORE, Captain, I.M.S.

(Sd.) J. CALCOTT GASKIN.

(L. S.) MUHAMMAD RAHIM-BIN-ABDUL NEBI SAFFER.

(Sd.) CURZON or KEDLESTON,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Fort William on the 16th day of February 1899.

Seal.

(Sd.) W. J. CUNNINGHAM,
Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.



APPENDIX B: U.N. Draft Resolution S/4855

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr. GENERAL

S/4855
6 July 1961

ORIGINAL ENGLISH

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council, having considered the question of Kuwait,

Noting the statements of the representatives of the parties concerned,

Noting that in response to the appeal of the Ruler of Kuwait, Saudi Arabian and British forces have been placed at the disposal of the Ruler,

Noting the statement by the representative of Iraq to the effect that the
Iraq Government undertakes to employ only peaceful means in the pursuance of its
policy,

Noting the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom that
British forces will be withdrawn from Kuwait as soon as the Ruler considers that
the threat to Kuwait is removed,

Recognising the importance of re-establishing peaceful conditions in the
area,

Welcoming any constructive steps which may be taken by the Arab League on
the line of the present resolution,

1. Calls upon all States to respect the independence and territorial

integrity of Kuwait;

2. Urges that all concerned should work for peace and tranquillity in the
area;

3. Agrees to keep the situation under review.

APPENDIX C: U.N. Draft Resolution S/4856

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.

~~GENERAL~~

S/4856

7 July 1961

ORIGINAL ENGLISH

United Arab Republics: draft resolution

The Security Council,
Having considered the items on the agenda,
Noting the statements of the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait,
Noting the statement by the representative of Iraq to the effect that the
Iraqi Government is pursuing peaceful means in the solution of the question,
Bearing in mind that peaceful conditions should prevail in the area,
1. Urges that the question be solved by peaceful means,
2. Calls upon the United Kingdom to withdraw immediately its forces from
Kuwait.

APPENDIX D: Proven Oil Reserves in the Middle East
by Country

Table III-1. Proven Oil Reserves in the Middle East, by Country^{a/}
(Millions of barrels)

Country	Proven reserves	Percentage of world total
Bahrain	245	0.1
Iran	35,000	11.3
Iraq	26,500	8.6
Israel	34	-
Kuwait	62,000	20.0
Neutral Zone	6,000	1.9
Qatar	2,750	0.9
Saudi Arabia	52,000	16.8
Syria	100	-
Trucial Coast	3,500	1.1
Turkey	75	-
UAR (Egypt)	710	0.2
Middle East total	188,914	60.9
World total	309,975	100.0

APPENDIX E: Allocation for Development Plans, 1951-1982

TABLE 9.1
Allocations for Development Plans, 1951-1982 (in US\$ millions)

Plan	Agriculture	Industry	Transport & Communications	Buildings & Business	Education & Research	Other	Total
1951/52-							
1955/56	30.0 (45.7%) ^a		15.9 (24.2%)	12.6 (19.2%)		7.2 (10.9%)	65.7
1951-52 ^b							
1956/57	53.4 (34.4%)	31.0 (19.9%)	26.6 (17.2%)	18 (11.6%)		26.2 (16.9%)	155.4
1955/56 ^c							
1959/60	114.4 (37.6%)	43.6 (14.3%)	74.2 (24.5%)	60.9 (20.0%)		11.4 (3.7%)	304.5
1955/56 ^d							
1960/61	168.1 (33.6%)	67.1 (13.4%)	124.4 (24.5%)	123.2 (24.6%)		17.3 (3.5%)	500.1
1959/60 ^e							
1962/63	49.9 (12.7%)	48.7 (12.4%)	100.8 (25.6%)	190.7 (48.4%)		4.0 (1.0%)	394.1
1961/62 ^f							
1965/66	113.0 (20.0%)	166.8 (29.4%)	136.5 (24.1%)	140.1 (24.7%)		10.0 (1.8%)	566.4
196 /66 ^g							
1969/70	142.0 (25.2%)	157.0 (28.0%)	91.0 (16.2%)	108.7 (19.4%)		62.5 (11.2%)	561.2
1970-1974 ^h	366.2 (19.0%)	391.0 (20.2%)	219.3 (11.3%)	283.0 (14.6%)		672.6 (34.8%)	1932.0
1975-1980 ⁱ	2370.4 (14.6%)	4938.0 (30.3%)	2484.1 (15.3%)	2646.3 (16.3%)	681.9 (4.2%)	3148.9 (19.4%)	16269.6
1981 ^j	681.0 (10.1%)	1246.0 (18.5%)	1284.5 (19.1%)	1899.1 (28.2%)	272.0 (4%)	1360.0 (20.2%)	6742.8
1982 ^j	768.4 (10.0%)	1315.6 (17.1%)	1386.9 (18.0%)	1656.3 (21.5%)	182.1 (2.4%)	2393.4 (31.1%)	7702.7

^a Percentages have been rounded and may not add up to 100.

^b Revision of previous plan on the recommendation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
^c Plan was implemented for three years.

^d Revisions of previous plan by the Development Board. Recently implemented at all.

APPENDIX F: Indices of Exports

Table 4-3. Indices of Exports of Groups of Products, Excluding Petroleum,
Selected Countries, 1958-1960¹

Country and item	1957 (millions of dollars)	(1957 = 100)		
		1958	1959	1960
<u>Cyprus:</u>				
Agricultural products	12.0	110	125	122
Mining products	25.8	84	87	92
<u>Iran:</u>				
Agricultural products	56.5	90	82	81
<u>Iraq:</u>				
Agricultural products	27.2	111	88	60
<u>Israel:</u>				
Agricultural products	54.0	106	107	119
Manufactured products	87.0	97	139	176
<u>Jordan:</u>				
Agricultural products	5.3	79	79	74
Mining products <u>a/</u>	2.5	112	112	144
<u>Lebanon:</u>				
Agricultural products	19.2	82	96	87
Manufactured products <u>b/</u>	8.4	48	63	75
<u>Syria:</u>				
Agricultural products	119.5	73	61	57
Manufactured products <u>c/</u>	9.3	73	69	65
<u>Turkey:</u>				
Agricultural products <u>d/</u>	287.9	69	104	84
Mining products	41.1	78	57	78
<u>UAR (Egypt):</u>				
Agricultural products	394.5	92	83	107
Manufactured products	25.5	122	133	178

Source: Based on data appearing in table IV-1.

a/ Exports of phosphates.

b/ Mainly precious metals.

c/ Mainly silk and artificial silk fabrics.

d/ Including agricultural products for industrial use.

APPENDIX G: Middle East Estimates of Population, by Country

Table VII-1. Middle East: Estimates of Total Population, by Country

(Thousands; percentage)

Country	1950	1955	1960	Percentage increase 1950 to 1960
Aden Colony	100	139	155	55
Aden Protectorate	660 ^{a/}	...
Bahrain ^{b/}	110	128	147	34
Cyprus	485	520	563	15
Gaza ^{c/}	198	214	256	29
Iran	16,276	18,325	20,182	24
Iraq	5,278	6,152	7,085	34
Israel	1,258	1,748	2,114	68
Immigration	(170)	(36)	(24)	...
Jordan ^{d/}	1,269	1,437	1,695	34
Kuwait ^{e/}	170	203	219 ^{a/}	29
Lebanon ^{f/}	1,257	1,466	1,646	31
Muscat and Oman ^{g/}	550 ^{a/}	...
Qatar	20 ^{h/}	35	45	125
Saudi Arabia	6,036
Syria ^{i/}	3,215	3,861	4,555	42
Trucial Oman ^{j/}	80 ^{h/}	80	86	8
Turkey ^{k/}	20,947	24,065	27,829	33
UAR (Egypt)	20,395 ^{l/}	23,063 ^{l/}	25,929 ^{m/}	27
Yemen	4,500 ^{h/}
Total ^{n/}	71,056	81,436	92,506	30

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (Sales No.: 61.XIII.1); Statistical Yearbook, 1960; Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 1962; Population and Vital Statistics Report, Statistical Papers, Series A, vol. XIII, No. 2; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook, 1960, vol. 14 (Rome); Israel: Statistical Abstract, 1961.

a/ 1959.

b/ Beginning 1956, excluding alien armed forces, merchant seamen and foreign diplomatic personnel.

c/ Registered Palestinian refugees only.

d/ Excluding foreigners and military personnel and their dependents living on military installations; including registered Palestinian refugees numbering 613,743 on 30 June 1960.

e/ The latest census, taken on 28 February 1957, showed a population of 206,473.

f/ Lebanese nationals only; excluding registered Palestinian refugees numbering 136,561 on 30 June 1960.

g/ Including data for port and peninsula of Qwadar ceded to Pakistan 8 September 1958.

h/ 1949.

i/ Excluding Palestinian refugees numbering 126,662 on 31 December 1960.

j/ Comprising the seven sheikdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 'Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Al Fujairah and the area lying within the modified Riyadh line, as announced in October 1955.

k/ Estimates as at 20 October of year stated.

l/ Excluding nomad population numbering 55,073 at 1947 census.

m/ According to the preliminary results of the 1960 census, total population in the United Arab Republic (Egypt) was 26,080,000.

n/ Excluding Aden Protectorate, Muscat and Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

APPENDIX H: Direction of Trade Report for Kuwait

TRADE WITH	EXPORTS				IMPORTS			
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1960	1961	1962	1963
IFS TOTAL	960.0	940.0	1050.0	1110.0	242.0	249.0	285.0	324.0
DOT TOTAL	1278.1	1281.8	1368.3	1402.1	241.7	249.8	285.4	323.8
DEVELOPED AREAS	1161.7	1190.8	1242.9	1267.6	179.4	195.9	216.0	242.1
INDUSTRIAL CTSYS	1156.8	1160.2	1198.2	1209.1	176.2	189.9	210.0	235.0
OTHER	24.9	30.6	46.7	58.5	3.2	6.0	6.0	7.1
LESS DEVELOPED	96.4	91.0	125.4	134.5	28.2	43.1	34.7	43.0
OIL EXPORTERS	10.9	9.2	3.9	4.8	6.2	10.0	8.9	11.9
OTHER	85.5	81.8	121.5	129.7	22.0	33.1	25.8	31.1
SINC-SOVIET AREA					1.1	10.8	2.2	2.9
UNCLASSIFIED					33.0		32.5	35.8
US AND CANADA	146.0	129.4	97.3	72.5	43.3	50.4	60.6	66.3
UNITED STATES	123.1	109.2	87.9	67.7	43.3	50.1	60.6	66.3
CANADA	22.7	20.2	9.4	4.8		.3		
UNITED KINGDOM	404.0	414.2	405.1	384.9	49.6	55.5	56.4	61.0
JAPAN	184.8	215.2	236.3	227.0	21.3	22.1	24.6	30.1
COMMON MARKET	407.5	399.0	453.9	516.7	57.1	52.7	62.5	72.2
BELGIUM LUX	14.5	3.9	18.8	54.8	10.3	6.7	8.8	9.8
FRANCE	128.2	144.8	134.7	134.7	5.3	4.9	7.4	8.7
GERMANY FED REP	23.9	32.0	35.8	37.9	22.9	24.2	24.7	30.1
ITALY	121.5	125.6	158.4	175.6	11.2	10.7	12.8	14.5
NETHERLANDS	119.4	93.1	106.2	113.7	7.4	6.2	8.8	9.1
OTHER IND W EUR	14.5	2.4	3.6	8.8	4.9	9.2	9.9	9.4
AUSTRIA						.9		
DENMARK	.1					1.6		
SWEDEN	10.7	1.6	2.4	2.0		1.1		
SWITZERLAND	3.6	.4	1.2	1.6	4.9	5.2	5.9	5.4
OTHER W EUROPE	6.3	9.8	18.0	17.3		2.3		
GREECE						.2		
SPAIN	6.3	9.8	16.4	14.9		.3		
YUGOSLAVIA				.1		.9		
AUST NZ S AFRICA	18.6	20.8	28.7	41.2	3.2	3.7	6.0	7.1
AUSTRALIA	18.6	20.8	28.0	41.2	3.2	3.4	6.0	7.1
LATIN AMERICA	27.4	22.3	24.0	20.1		.1		
ARGENTINA	1.0		.9			.1		
BRAZIL	25.6	22.3	23.1	20.1				
URUGUAY								
MIDDLE EAST	59.1	38.6	56.0	53.8	16.0	22.8	19.8	24.5
ACEN	46.9	26.9	41.1	31.7				
IRAN	10.9	9.2	3.9	4.8	3.4	7.3	6.2	7.6
IRAQ					2.0	2.1	2.7	4.3
JORDAN		.8	.4	.1		1.5		
LEBANON	.5	1.2	.8	.9	6.4	6.9	7.8	9.2
SYRIA	.5	.2		.7		2.4		
UNITED ARAB REP	.3	.2	9.8	19.6		2.0		
AREAS N S					3.4		3.1	3.4

APPENDIX I: Exports by Country of Destination

Exports* by Country of Destination (Value in K.D.)

1960 — 1964

Country of Destination	Years				
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Saudi Arabia	1,576,481	1,535,415	1,513,402	2,369,097	3,550,072
Iran	2,894,674	3,417,191	1,793,492	2,294,436	1,757,210
Iraq	1,167,057	1,244,413	268,390	1,558,995	1,330,814
Oman	185,955	251,764	425,252	495,952	3,966
Jordan	81,210	89,173	538,403	437,943	153,506
Lebanon	277,267	373,020	455,737	428,395	652,760
Qatar	318,712	332,299	416,343	416,228	597,623
Bahrain	171,671	205,347	228,819	355,090	361,218
India	66,389	114,349	252,147	280,426	248,199
Arabian Gulf Countries	89	65,997	114,056	270,670	1,010,966
United Kingdom ...	275,149	370,091	259,929	255,143	464,260
U. A. R.	90,882	117,649	970,375	220,812	159,368
Sudan	47	13,848	3,258	185,570	4,517
Pakistan	128,141	185,388	136,062	165,112	207,752
U. S. A.	104,483	97,383	140,855	145,570	179,763
Japan	72,978	114,088	42,066	100,031	162,285
Other Countries ...	683,195	376,511	385,643	489,768	963,580
Total ...	8,094,380	8,903,926	7,944,229	10,469,238	11,807,859
Bunkers and Ship Stores	196,881	260,040	157,309	25,604	79,668
Grand Total ...	8,291,261	9,163,966	8,101,538	10,494,842	11,887,527

* Including re-exports, but excluding oil.

* The value of Exports is F.O.B.

Source : Statistical Section — Customs and Ports.

APPENDIX J: Direction of Trade Report for Iraq

TRADE WITH	EXPORTS				IMPORTS			
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1958	1959	1960	1961
DIT TOTAL	566.9	605.8	645.4	660.1	272.3	325.6	391.7	384.7
INDUSTRIAL CTS	393.8	487.5	549.2	525.0	212.1	236.3	261.3	256.9
NON-INDUSTRIAL	126.7	107.6	89.1	125.0	48.1	69.9	91.7	86.2
OIL EXPORTERS	9.0	8.1	2.6	10.3	2.2	2.1	2.7	2.7
OTHERS	119.7	99.5	86.5	114.7	45.9	67.8	89.0	83.5
SOVIET AREA		6.1	4.1	4.7	12.1	19.4	30.1	41.6
UNCLASSIFIED	44.4	4.6	3.0	5.4		6		
US AND CANADA	23.0	25.8	17.6	19.7	43.2	35.5	45.6	42.4
UNITED STATES	22.8	25.7	17.6	19.5	42.6	33.2	44.0	41.0
CANADA	2.2	0.1		0.2	0.6	2.0	1.6	1.4
UNITED KINGDOM	60.3	107.0	111.3	93.0	34.5	100.9	95.4	90.3
COMMON MARKET	282.5	316.7	371.0	370.7	45.7	59.6	78.6	81.3
BELGIUM LUX	8.2	23.5	40.0	39.0	19.5	15.9	25.1	21.6
FRANCE	131.5	129.6	104.8	93.8	6.5	8	12	
GERMANY REP FED	51.0	57.1	65.9	58.9		27.9	34.9	38.4
ITALY	67.1	79.0	112.3	124.5	10.4	4.2	7.7	10.6
NETHERLANDS	24.7	27.5	46.0	54.5	9.3	10.8	10.7	10.7
OTHER IN EUROPE	41.9	42.1	44.3	55.1	17.5	21.0	29.2	29.6
AUSTRIA	1				2.1	2.2	3.2	3.0
DENMARK	4.6	0.5	0.3	0.6	1.5	2.2	2.3	2.9
FINLAND					0.4	0.9	1.4	2.1
GREECE					1.0	1.3	0.5	0.6
IRELAND		2.0		7.1	0.3			
NORWAY					1.2	1.1	1.9	1.7
PORTUGAL	15.5	15.6	24.0	20.0	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.8
SPAIN	17.8	21.6	20.0	23.5	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.9
SWEDEN	0.1			0.1	6.5	6.9	9.1	11.3
SWITZERLAND					3.3	4.2	7.0	4.7
TURKEY				0.4			0.9	
YUGOSLAVIA	3.3	2.2		3.4	0.2	1.1	1.8	1.6
SOVIET EUROPE		3.9	4.1	3.3	5.9	15.4	31.0	35.3
USSR		2.5	4.1	2.0		4.0	7.3	12.1
BULGARIA					0.2	0.7	2.2	1.7
CZECHOSLOVAKIA		0.5		0.8	2.9	5.1	9.8	9.3
GERMANY EAST		0.3		0.3	0.4	1.6	2.4	2.5
HUNGARY		0.2		0.2	1.3	2.5	4.7	3.2
POLAND		0.3			0.6	0.8	2.7	4.3
RUMANIA		0.1			0.5	0.7	1.9	2.2
LATIN AMERICA					0.9	1.8	2.2	1.6
CUBA						1.7	0.8	2.0
OTHER IN HEMIS						0.2	0.1	0.4
MIDDLE EAST	52.8	34.4	6.4	33.8	12.5	12.0	14.4	13.1
ADEN	33.2	18.8		13.9	0.1	0.1		
BAHREIN	0.4	0.3		0.1				

(CONTINUED)

APPENDIX K: Iraq: Direction of Trade, by Major Country Groupings

Table IV-2. Iraq: Direction of Trade, by Major Country Groupings, 1960-1962

(Values in millions of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1960	1961	1962
Total exports (including oil) ^{a/}	233.62	236.34	247.15
Total imports ^{b/}	138.91	145.67	128.76
<u>Middle East countries</u>			
Value of exports	5.01	7.24	8.51
Percentage of total	(2)	(3)	(3)
Value of imports	5.05	4.59	5.32
Percentage of total	(4)	(3)	(4)
<u>EEC countries</u>			
Value of exports	108.38	132.48	137.40
Percentage of total	(46)	(56)	(56)
Value of imports	27.48	29.23	28.80
Percentage of total	(20)	(20)	(22)
<u>Rest of western Europe</u>			
Value of exports	57.20	51.58	58.00
Percentage of total	(24)	(22)	(23)
Value of imports	42.10	40.63	30.31
Percentage of total	(30)	(28)	(23)
<u>United States</u>			
Value of exports	6.38	7.01	2.95
Percentage of total	(3)	(3)	(1)
Value of imports	15.75	15.66	14.90
Percentage of total	(11)	(11)	(12)
<u>Centrally planned countries</u>			
Value of exports	1.43	1.71	3.11
Percentage of total	(1)	(1)	(1)
Value of imports	12.18	16.60	18.80
Percentage of total	(9)	(11)	(15)
<u>Rest of the world</u>			
Value of exports	55.22	38.03	37.34
Percentage of total	(24)	(16)	(15)
Value of imports	36.35	38.96	30.63
Percentage of total	(26)	(27)	(24)

United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1961.

Iraq: Ministry of Planning, Summary of Foreign Trade Statistics, 1962
(Baghdad).